The frames are Kripke structures F = (W; ), where W is a set of possible worlds, and is an equivalence relation called the indistinguishability relation for the reasoning agent. Models are frames with valuations: M = (F; V ), where F = (W; ) and V : W ! 2 P . The semantics of formulas is then given by: { M; w j = p i p 2 V (w). { M; w j = : i M; w 6 j = . { M; w j = _ i (M; w j = or M; w j = ). { M; w j = K i 8w 0 w, M; w 0 j = .
The satis ability and model checking problems for the logic are decidable, the set of valid formulas can be axiomatized ( FHMV95]).
Ascribed knowledge
An assertion K in this logic can be read as:`the reasoning agent knows that the formula holds'. What kind of knowledge is referred to here ? There are (at least) two ways of interpreting this statement (see HM92] for a related discussion): { The agent possesses this knowledge in some actual sense; for instance, the agent can provide evidence in support of the assertion , or can answer some queries about' . { This is knowledge ascribed to the agent by an observer outside the system. The observer considers all the information available to the agent at the world state w and concludes that is logically implied by such information, and therefore, can use the system as if the agent knew . Clearly, the indistinguishability relation in the frames captures the notion of information in the latter sense (by describing the agent's information partitions of the set of states), and thus the latter interpretation is more immediate. Limited as it may seem, this reading is still immensely useful, as we can meaningfully ascribe knowledge to thermostats, computer programs and other such entities in this manner (\the thermostat knows that the room is too warm, so it switches on the air conditioner", \the program knows that the shared resource which is in use will be released within t units, so it decides to wait until then", and so on). Such knowledge assertions can be useful in system veri cation.
Limited visibility
This reading is not useful in situations where an agent in a system needs to compute its knowledge on the basis of evidence available to it. There is a way in which explicit knowledge di ers from implicit knowledge, one which is especially important in the context of distributed computing. A reasoner operating in an environment has only a limited view of the world, and her explicit knowledge is determined by the visibility of world states to her, whereas ascribed implicit knowledge of the agent depends on her behaviour in all possible worlds. In terms of the indistinguishability relation above, computing in itself may necessitate some e ort. We can conceive of a situation where s 0 s 1 s 2 , but at state s 0 only s 0 and s 1 are visible to a computing agent and not s 2 . That is, an observer who has access to complete information about all the world states may declare that the agent would behave in the same way in all these three states, but the agent itself may require computation to realise this. If the agent makes the e ort and computes the world state s 2 , it may also realise that s 2 is in the same equivalence class as s 1 . Visibility can also seen as a manifestation of resource boundedness: a resource limited agent might need to reuse its resources, and thus computation rendering a state visible may entail losing information about other visible states making them no longer visible. Thus in the example above, as the agent computes the state s 2 , it might`forget' the information about s 0 . Thus, even among states within the same externally ascribed indistinguishability class, some may be`farther' and some`nearer' in terms of visibility to an agent. In the context of distributed systems, this happens routinely. A component of a system behaves in the same manner in all global system states in which its local state is the same. Hence all these states would be ascribed in the same equivalence class for that agent. However, this component would typically communicate only with immediate neighbours in the network, and may not even be aware of the existence of many other`distant' components in the network. In this case, for the agent to compute its knowledge, the rst task of computing these indistinguishable system states is well beyond its capabilities. Moreover, at di erent system states, the agent may have di erent views, and this is also dependent on the computational resources available to the agent. For instance, a dynamic computational agent with bounded memory may forget events in the distant past. Even in static situations, computation may result in learning thereby enlarging visibility. This aspect of the distinction between ascribed and computed knowledge of view-limited reasoners seems to have been relatively less studied in the literature.
Algorithmic knowledge
In this context, we should mention one way in which implicit and explicit knowledge have been distinguished extensively in the literature, where again view limitations seem relevant. In the logic de ned above, a reasoner knows every logical consequence of any fact she knows; further she knows all the valid formulas. Human reasoners simply do not exhibit such logical omniscience, and hence the logic above does not re ect reasoning about human knowledge. On the other hand, if we consider the reasoner above to be a computing agent, we come up with the problem of resource boundedness. The agent has only limited computational resources at its disposal, and exploring all the logical consequences of an assumption is expensive business. In particular, the validity problem for the propositional calculus is already co-NPcomplete, and for the reasoner to know all tautologies requires, at the least, a co-NP machine. See FHMV 95] for a detailed treatment of this issue. Clearly explicit knowledge should be resource bounded. The papers of Rohit Parikh ( Pa 87a], Pa 87b], Pa 90] and Pa 94]) provide all manners of criticism which include the two observations above and much more. For instance, he discusses the distinction between knowledge and information; the distinction between knowledge of a proposition and knowledge of the sentence denoting the proposition, and so on. In some sense, all these can be seen as further re nements of the distinction between knowledge explicitly available to an agent and implicit knowledge ascribed to the agent.
An algorithm-based notion of knowledge has been proposed in FHMV 95] (Chapter 10) and Pa 87a] to capture explicit knowledge. This works as follows: at any state s, when asked whether a formula holds, the reasoner evokes an algorithm available at s. If the algorithm returns`Yes', we say that the reasoner explicitly (or algorithmically) knows . Depending on whether the algorithm gives only`Yes/No' outputs or whether it also has the possibility of a`?' output meaning`I cannot nd out within the resources available to me', we get the notions studied in FHMV 95] or Pa 87a], respectively. FHMV 95] restricts the algorithm to be local, in the sense that when s s 0 , the algorithm invoked by the reasoner at s is the same as at s 0 . Unfortunately, the framework is also very general and it is hard to study properties of this notion of knowledge. How do we relate di erent algorithms used by di erent reasoners ? When we iterate modalities to say that i knows that j knows that holds, should i have access to j's algorithm as well ? If the system moves from a state s to state s 0 , how should the algorithms available at the two states be related ? Further, the invocation of an algorithm is an extra-logical notion and as it is, we have no way of studying algorithmic knowledge logically. On the other hand, the algorithm-based formulation of explicit knowledge is interesting particularly because it avoids many of the philosophical pitfalls which cause criticism. One way of studying algorithmic knowledge logically is to decide that all reasoners uniformly use the same algorithm, namely the model checking algorithm for the logic. This means that when is valid, the reasoner knows to be true but does not know that it is valid. This is because , being a valid formula, happens also to be true in all the states being checked by the algorithm, and thus is explicitly known, but then so are many other non-valid formulas which simply happen to be true in the checked model. (See HV 91] for more general arguments advocating model checking rather than theorem proving in the context of reasoning about systems.) The framework facilitates the study of knowledge based on probabilistic algorithms ( KNP 90]) and action based on knowledge ( HF 89], R96a]). This circumvents many of the diculties mentioned above, but a requirement that all reasoners use the same knowledge algorithm seems too strong. It is here that a view-based notion of knowledge helps, whereby we can have a uniform logical notion of all reasoners invoking the same model checking algorithm, but they run the algorithm on di erent sub-models.
This paper
In this paper, we approach the problem by asking: if knowledge amounts to model checking, which model is to be checked ? We hypothesize that due to limited visibility, the agent can see only a substructure of the given model, and hence checks for truth in that substructure. Thus an agent claims that holds at a state if holds in the substructure visible to the agent at that state. We can then say that the agent claims to know if holds in the substructure at all the visible indistinguishable states. This gives a framework in which a form of algorithmic knowledge is studied logically, and which takes into account the limited visibility of agents. Thus we have three basic notions: truth of a proposition, ascribed knowledge of propositions (determined by indistinguishability relations) and claimed knowledge (determined by views). The third notion is dependent on the agent's view, and hence when the view changes, knowledge claimed by the agent changes as well.
The logic
We now present a logic of view-based explicit knowledge. This is simply the usual logic of knowledge augmented with a new modality: X will denote that the formula holds explicitly (or visibly) for the reasoner. For explicit knowledge, we will use formulas of the form XK . (As FHMV 95] observe in Chapter 10, this should be seen as a reasoner claiming to know rather than knowing .)
Syntax
Formally, we have a countable set of propositions P = fp 0 ; p 1 ; : : :g as before and the syntax of formulas is given by:
::= p 2 P j : j _ j K j X The xed formula p 0 _:p 0 is called True. , the set of formulas introduced earlier, is a subset of and formulas in are referred to as X-free formulas. The other logical connectives are de ned as usual. The intended meaning of X at w should be clear now: it simply asserts that holds in the substructure induced by (w) at w. We assume that all other connectives have the same meanings as before.
M; w j = X i w 2 (w) and Md (w); w j = As usual, we say is satis able if there exists a view model M = ((W; ; ); V ) such that for some w 2 W, we have M; w j = . In addition, we say is explicitly satis able if there exists a model M = ((W; ; ); V ) such that for some w 2 W, we have W = (w) and M; w j = . A formula is (explicitly) valid if and only if its negation is not (explicitly) satis able. Note that is explicitly satis able i X is satis able, and is explicitly valid i Y is valid.
The rst thing to note is that the modality does not collapse | in the sense that there are formulas such that X is not valid. To see this, consider the view frame given by: W = fw 1 ; w 2 g, = W W and (w j ) = fw j g for j 2 f1; 2g. Let M be a model on this frame with the valuation: V (w 1 ) = ; and V (w 2 ) = fpg. Clearly, we see that M; w 1 j = (Lp^:XLp), and that M; w 2 j = (:Kp^XKp).
Secondly, consider the dual modality: Y is a weaker assertion { at w it only means that if w 2 (w) then Md (w); w j = , and hence can be true vacuously. However, we can check that the implication X Y is valid and that the implication becomes an equivalence over models based on recognizable frames.
Thirdly, though X is not valid, X is explicitly valid, as we would expect. Further, the equivalences XX X XY and YX Y YY are valid. Thus we have a modality which is not like a traditional S5 modality and somewhat di erent from a usual belief modality. To see this, note that K and :K K:K are valid formulas, but X and :X X:X are not. But X:X X: is valid, but such an assertion is not defensible if we interpret X as a belief modality, since an agent may not believe that holds and be aware of such a belief, but may yet not believe that the denial of holds either.
Like the K and L modalities, the X and Y modalities also collapse at the second level. We get nontrivial second level modalities only by looking at alternations of the knowledge and explicitness modalities like XK, XL etc. Indeed, a formula like XLXLXKp may not in general be collapsible to any smaller formula. Therefore, we will be interested in the modal alternation depth of a formula, which will be formally de ned later.
Substructures
How do we determine the size of a nite view frame ? This is important, for questions like model checking, where we are given a view model M, an element w in M and a formula , and asked whether M; w j = . When this is a decidable problem, we are interested in the complexity of the decision procedure in terms of the input size, namely the size of M and the length of . For a nite frame F = (W; ; ), we might think of j W j as the size of F, but this can really be misleading. Consider a structure W = fw 0 ; w 1 ; : : :g, where for all j, (w j ) = fw j ; w j+1 g and some model M based on it. Then for any modal formula , the truth of at w j (j > 0) in the structure Md (w j ) is in general independent of the truth of the same formula at the same state in the structure Md (w j?1 ).
Thus, for any formula and worlds w 1 ; w 2 such that w 2 2 (w 1 ), we need to see whether Md (w 1 ); w 2 j = holds. But there is still worse to come: when this formula is of the form X , this requires us to look at the substructure obtained by restricting to ( (w 1 ) \ (w 2 )) which need not be of the form (w) for any w 2 W. Therefore, in the worst case, we should be prepared to look at MdS; w j = for arbitrary nonempty subsets S of W (such that w 2 S). This makes the logic hard to decide.
Can we nd formulas that force us to look at substructures in the manner described above ? For instance, consider the frame F = (W; ; ), where W = fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 g, = W W, and is given by: (w 1 ) = fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 g, (w 2 ) = fw 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 g, (w 3 ) = fw 1 ; w 3 ; w 4 g and (w 4 ) = fw 4 g. Consider the valuation V (w 3 ) = fpg, and for all w 6 = w 3 , V (w) = ;. Let In general, given a frame F = (W; ; ), where j W j= n, there may be as many as O(n n ) substructures of interest for checking truth of a formula. This crucially depends on how nasty the view function of the frame happens to be, as well as the modal alternation depth of the formula to be checked. For formulas, we have already pointed out that modal alternation depth is a parameter of interest. Similarly, the depth to which we need to look at substructures of substructures matters as well. Condition (iii) is referred to as a coherence condition; we will see a need to weaken this condition in the next section. If F = (W; ; ) is a frame, it induces a view tree on F: the root is labelled W, and whenever there is a node labelled S and w 2 (S \ (w)) 6 = S, there exists an edge to a node labelled S \ (w). All view trees upto a speci c depth on the same frame are isomorphic, so we can speak of the d depth view tree associated with a frame.
3 Decidability For convenience, we assume from now on that the constant True 2 . Before we proceed to look for decision procedures for satis ability for this logic, some observations simplifying the problem can be made. In any structure F = (W; ; ), when we are interested in satisfying a given formula at a world w 0 2 W, we can simply restrict ourselves to the substructure induced by the equivalence class of w 0 under . For logics of knowledge where there is only one knower, the accessibility relation may as well be universal. In fact, this observation is used to show that satis ability is in NP. It is no surprise that such universal models su ce for this logic as well. show that for any node in this (same) tree and w 2 S = ( ), MdS; w j = i M 0 dS; w j = , for any formula . In particular this holds for w 0 2 W = ( 0 ) and 0 .
Thus 0 is satis ed in the almost recognizable model M 0 .
In universal frames, we can simply drop the indistinguishability relation and work with only the view function . Unfortunately the logic is still hard to analyse. In the examples considered earlier, the frames were all universal, and yet we needed to look at substructures. However, we will show that the logic enjoys a bounded pseudo-model property, so that we can limit the size of W when we search for models for any given formula. This bound will depend on the modal alternation depth of a formula, de ned as follows:
De nition 7 The modal alternation depth of a formula , denoted ( ) is dened as follows: Proposition 8 Let F = (W; ; ) be a frame and F = ( ; !; ) be a view tree on F. Let M = (F; V ), 2 , S = ( ), w 2 (S \ (w)) and X a formula such that (X ) = ( ). Then MdS; w j = X i MdS; w j = .
PROOF. The proof is by induction on . When = p 2 P, the assertion follows from the fact that V dS = V d(S \ (w)). The boolean cases follow from the validity of identities X: (XT rue^:X ) and X( 1 _ 2 ) (X 1 _ X 2 ). cannot be of the form K since (XK ) 6 = ( ). If is of the form X , the assertion follows from the validity of the identity XX = X .
De nition 9 The subformula closure of a formula , denoted SF( ) is de ned in the usual manner: SF 0 ( ) is the least set containing and satisfying the follow- In the only interesting case of the induction step when is of the form X , note that is a leaf node of F i depth of is d or for every w 2 S = ( ), if w 2 (w) then S = (w). In the former case, ( ) = 0, then (X ) = ( ), hence by Proposition 8, MdS; w j = X i MdS; w j = , and the induction hypothesis gives the required assertion. In the latter case, S \ (w) = S, hence MdS; w j = X i MdS; w j = i (by induction hypothesis) 2 L( ; w) i (by construction) X 2 L( ; w). The case when S is not a leaf node also follows easily from the induction hypothesis and the construction. 
Satis ability
Fix a formula 0 and let SF denote SF( 0 ). This is the formula whose satis ability we will be concerned with: Proposition 12 An X-free formula 2 SF is satis able i AT contains a subset which is good for .
PROOF. For any formula , if it is satis able, let M = ((W; ; ); V ) and w 2 W such that M; w j = . Consider the set f (w 0 ) j w 0 wg, where (w 0 ) = f 2 SF j M; w 0 j = g. It is easy to see that each element of the set is an atom and that the set is good.
On the other hand, let 2 SF be X-free and let Q AT be good with A 2 Q, in A. De ne the frame F = (Q; ; ), where for all B 2 Q, (B) = Q. De ne V (B) = B \ P. This gives a model M and by an easy induction on the structure of , we can show that for any B 2 Q, M; B j = i 2 B. We thus get M; A j = , hence is satis able.
We now come to the main construction for checking satis ability. The idea is (as usual) to build a nite model for any satis able formula , in such a way that the size of the model is bounded by a function of j j. If this nite model is constructed in some canonical fashion, then checking for satis ability amounts to an attempt at building this model; the attempt succeeds i the formula is satis able. As it turns out, we will work with structures (called witness structures below) that do not quite de ne models, but act as pseudo-models from which we can pull out models. Note that every view tree on a frame is a partial view tree on that frame as well. Also, nodes at depth 1 in partial view trees exactly specify , as in view trees. Thus for w 2 W such that w 2 (w), either (w) = W = ( 0 ), or there is a depth 1 node w in with ( w ) = (w). We use the notation 0 for the root, w for this node ( 0 or a unique depth 1 node), dw to denote the subtree of rooted at w , and dw for the set of nodes in this subtree. When F is a partial view tree on F of depth d, we say that F has a ( ; w 0 ) requirement at w i the node is in F dw, depth of is k < d and there is an (ii) There exists w 0 2 W such that 0 2 T( 0 ; w 0 ).
When T is a witness structure on a frame F based on F and F has a requirement, then we usually also say that T has that requirement in F, and call T a partial witness structure in this case. Clearly, a witness structure T based on a view tree has no requirements, and in that case, we call T a complete witness structure. On the other hand, when MdS; w j = X , then we can proceed in a similar manner to show that X 2 T( ; w).
Thus, if we can build a view tree and a (complete) witness structure for a formula on it, then that formula is satis able. On the other hand, whenever we are given a model for a formula, we can build a partial view tree on a frame of bounded size and a (partial) witness structure for that formula on it.
Lemma 15 If 0 is satis able, then there exists a nite frame F = (W; ; ) and a partial witness structure for 0 Let be a node in F and let S ( ). If w 2 (S \ (w)), it is easy to see that S \ ( w]) S \ (w), though not necessarily the other way around. This is because, we can have w 1 2 (S ? (w)) and w 2 2 ( (w) ? S) such that w 1 w 2 , and hence w 1 ] = w 2 ] = x 2 (S \ (w)), but there need be no w 0 2 (S \ (w)) such that w 0 ] = x. Thus, in e ect, when we`quotient' F , we get a partial view tree. We make this precise now.
Construct the tree = ( ; ); ) and a map : ! de ned as follows: ( 0 ) This is well-de ned, because for all w 0 2 S such that x = w 0 ], T( ; w) = T( ; w 0 ), by de nition of . We now claim that T is a witness structure on F for 0 based on the partial view tree . This is proved easily: observe that when the set fT( ; w) j w 2 ( )g is good, then so is the set fT( We next show that whenever we have a partial witness structure T for 0 on a nite frame F, we can extend it to a (possibly in nite) frame F 0 with a complete witness structure T 0 on it. Once we show this, Lemmas 14 and 15 then imply that a formula is satis able i there exists a partial witness structure for it on a bounded size frame. To prove this, we rst need to make the notion of`extending' frames precise.
Let T be a partial witness structure on a frame F = (W; ) and F = ( ; !; ), a partial view tree associated with it. Let T 0 be a partial witness structure on frame F 0 where F 0 = (W 0 ; 0 ) and F 0 = ( 0 ; ! 0 ; 0 ) is a partial view tree associated with F 0 such that W W 0 . Let w 2 W such that (w) = 0 (w). We say that T 0 extends T at w i T( 0 ; w) = T 0 ( 0 0 ; w) and if w 2 (w), then F dw is isomorphic to F 0 dw, given by a bijection f : dw ! 0 dw such that for all 2 dw, ( ) = 0 (f( )), and for all w 0 2 ( ), T( ; w 0 ) = T 0 (f( ); w 0 ).
We now show how to extend partial view trees to view trees. The strategy is to pick one w, ful ll all requirements at w and then move to the next. A requirement in a partial view tree is typically an edge w 0 ! 0 , in the subtree rooted at w , where S = ( ( ) \ (w 0 )) ? ( 0 ) 6 = ;. Let w 1 2 S. We extend the frame to a larger one by adding a new element w 2 and replacing (w 0 ) by ( (w 0 ) ? fw 1 g) fw 2 g in the new frame. If we do this for every element in S, in the resulting frame, this particular requirement does not exist. This construction is repeated at all levels in the subtree rooted at w, giving a new structure without any requirements at w. Suppose that we have ful lled all w 1 -requirements. Then how can we be sure that while ful lling some w 2 -requirement, we will not generate new w 1 -requirements ? Note that in the construction suggested above, while ful lling requirements at w, a new requirement may be generated for w 0 only if w 0 2 (w). Therefore, once we ful ll all w 1 -requirements, if we have that w 1 6 2 (w 2 ) for any w 2 that may be considered later, we can ensure that no new w 1 -requirements will arise. The following proposition asserts that we can always \relabel" elements in a frame and retain a partial witness structure in such a way that a designated world w is not visible from any other world in the resulting frame, except possibly from itself.
Proposition 16 Given a partial witness structure T on a nite frame F = (W; ; ), and w 2 W, there exists a partial witness structure T 0 on a frame F 0 = (W 0 ; 0 ; 0 ) such that W W 0 , (w) = 0 (w), for all w 0 2 (W 0 ?fwg), w 6 2 0 (w 0 ) and T 0 extends T at w.
PROOF. Fix w and let w 0 6 = w such that w 2 (w 0 ). Pick x 6 2 W and set W 0 = W fxg. De ne 0 (x) = ; if (w) is empty, and otherwise let 0 (x) = ( (w) ? fwg) fxg. For w 00 2 W ?fwg, if w 2 (w 00 ) then de ne 0 (w 00 ) = ( (w 00 ) ?fwg) fxg; otherwise set 0 (w 00 ) = (w 00 ). De ne 0 = f(x; x)g f(x; w 00 ); (w 00 ; x) j w w 00 g. . For all w 0 2 W j?1 , if w 0 2 (w 0 ), j contains a subtree isomorphic to j?1 dw 0 with labels changed as follows: given a node j in j dw 0 whose image is j?1 in j?1 , if j?1 ( j?1 ) = R, and R \ S 0 = ;, then j ( j ) = R; in this case, set T j ( j ; w 0 ) = T j?1 ( j?1 ; w 0 ), for w 0 2 R. Otherwise, j ( j ) = (R ? S) fg(u l ) j u l 2 j?1 ( j?1 )g. Then set T j ( j ; w 0 ) = T j?1 ( j?1 ; w 0 ), for w 0 2 (R ? S), and set T j ( j ; x l ) = T j?1 ( j?1 ; u l ). For x i such that x i 2 j (x i ), j contains a subtree isomorphic to j?1 du i , with labels changed and T j extended again exactly as above.
It is easy to see that T j is a partial witness structure on F j based on j , satisfying the inductive conditions, as required. The construction gives the required partial witness structure T m on F m with no requirements at w.
Lemma 18 If 0 has a partial witness structure T on a nite universal frame F = (W; ) such that 0 2 T( 0 ; w 0 ) for some w 0 2 W, then there exists a complete witness structure T 0 for 0 on a universal frame F 0 such that T 0 extends T at w 0 .
PROOF. Fix T, F = (W; ), w 0 2 W and F as above. Fix a countable set U = W fu 0 ; u 1 ; : : :g such that for all j, u j 6 2 W, and an enumeration of U such that elements of W precede elements in U ? W in the enumeration. We now de ne a sequence of nite universal frames F 0 ; F 1 ; : : :, with partial witness structures T i on F i , i 0, with the following properties: let F i = (W i ; i ) and S i W i such that T i has no requirement at any w 2 S i , i 0. Such a construction ensures the following property: for all w 2 U, there exists n w such that for all k n w , w 2 W k , k (w) = nw (w) and T k extends T nw at w. For any node 2 lim , and u 2 lim ( ), if is the root, then T lim ( ; u) = T i ( 0;i ; u), where i is the least index such that u 2 W i and 0;i is the root in i . Otherwise, 2 lim dw for some w 2 W lim . De ne T lim ( ; u) = T nw ( ; u).
It can be easily checked that T lim is a complete witness structure on the frame F lim , as required.
Lemmas 14, 15 and 18 togther show that a formula is satis able i it has a partial witness structure.
Theorem 19 The satis ability of a formula can be decided in nondeterministic PROOF. Fix the formula 0 of length m whose satis ability is to be decided. There are at most 2 O(m) atoms. Given a k-element set S, constructing a tree labelled by decreasing subsets of S, assigning an atom to each element in each node, checking that the structure is a view tree and that it gives a partial witness structure can be done by a nondeterministic Turing machine in time k d+1 . By Lemmas 14, 15 and 18, we know that 0 is satis able i there is a partial witness structure for it over a set whose size is at We have thus shown that the satis ability and model checking problems for the logic are elementarily decidable. Moreover, note that the complexity of model checking is linear in the size of the formula, and if we con ne our attention to formulas of bounded alternation depth, then it is also polynomial in the size of the model.
Monotone frames
In an example discussed earlier, we considered a frame where w 0 w 1 w 2 where (w 0 ) = fw 0 ; w 1 g and (w 1 ) = fw 1 ; w 2 g. We might see this as the agent`forgetting' the information about w 0 at w 1 ; for instance, this may be a case of reusing memory to compute the state w 2 . We now consider the subclass of frames where this cannot happen, and in which visibility preserves logical indistinguishability.
De nition 20 A view frame F = (W; ; ) is said to be monotone if and only if it is weakly recognizable, and 8w; w 1 ; w 2 2 W, if fw 1 ; w 2 g (w) and w 1 w 2 then (w) \ (w 1 ) = (w) \ (w 2 ).
In monotone frames, once two logically indistinguishable worlds become visible from another, they both contain the same information, in the sense that at w, the agent considers the same world to be visible at w 1 as at w 2 . The following properties of view functions in monotone frames make this clearer.
Proposition 21 Let F = (W; ; ) be a monotone frame. (i) 8w 1 ; w 2 2 W, if w 2 2 (w 1 ) and w 1 w 2 then (w 1 ) = (w 2 ).
(ii) 8w; w 1 ; w 2 2 W, if fw 1 ; w 2 g (w) and w 1 w 2 then (w 1 ) = (w 2 ).
PROOF. Assume that w 2 2 (w 1 ) and w 1 w 2 . By weak recognizability, w 1 2 (w 1 ). By de nition of monotonicity, since fw 1 ; w 2 g (w 1 ) and w 1 w 2 , we get (w 1 ) = (w 1 )\ (w 2 ), that is, (w 1 ) (w 2 ). But then w 1 2 (w 2 ) as well, and again by weak recognizability, w 2 2 (w 2 ). Now we have fw 1 ; w 2 g (w 2 ) and as before we nd that (w 2 ) (w 1 ). Thus, (w 1 ) = (w 2 ), establishing the rst statement. The de nition of monotonicity and the hypotheses of (ii) together imply that w 1 2 (w 2 ) and w 2 2 (w 1 ), and the claim follows from (i). Note that the implication XL LX is monotone valid, though not valid. To see this, suppose M; w j = XL in a monotone model M. Then, w 2 (w) and Md (w); w j = L . Let w 0 2 (w) and w w 0 such that Md (w); w 0 j = . By proposition above, (w) = (w 0 ) and hence we have Md (w 0 ); w 0 j = . That is, M; w 0 j = X . Since w w 0 , we get M; w j = LX , as required.
Checking truth
The advantage of monotone frames is clearly seen by the implications of Proposition 21: consider a universal monotone frame F = (W; ), and note that partitions W into sets W 1 ; W 2 ; : : : etc such that a world in W i is visible from a world in W j i i = j. Thus the frame is split into a set of universal subframes. Further, observe that for every formula and w; w 0 2 W such that w 0 2 (w), since (w) = (w 0 ), Md (w); w 0 j = i Md (w 0 ); w 0 j = :
Thus, given a frame with k worlds in it, there are at most k + 1 substructures which we need to work with when we wish to check truth. The bene ts bestowed by these observations are immediate:
Theorem 23 The monotone truth checking problem is solvable in time O(n:k), where k is the size of the given structure and n is the length of the checked formula.
PROOF. Suppose that we are given a monotone model M = ((W; ; ); V ), an element w 0 2 W and a formula 0 . We con ne our attention to the universal submodel de ned by w 0 ] = fw 0 ; w 1 ; : : : ; w k?1 g, say. Since M is monotone, partitions w 0 ].
Assume that there is an enumeration of W listing the partitions contiguously, so that for 0 j k, there exist j 1 ; j 2 such that j 1 j j 2 and fw j 1 ; : : : ; w j 2 g is one of the partitions induced by . Fix an enumeration of SF in order of non-decreasing length.
We label each world w 2 W by an ordered pair (L 1 ; L 2 ), both subsets of SF. Initially, for all w, set w:L 1 = w:L 2 = V (w) \SF. We now describe the labelling procedure for all w j :L 2 , 0 j k, where we consider pairs of the form ( ; w j ) in the lexicographic order de ned by the enumeration of SF and W xed above: It is easy to check that for all 2 SF and w 2 W, M; w j = i 2 w:L 1 , and for w 2 (w), Md (w); w j = i 2 w:L 2 . Hence the algorithm is correct and runs in time O(n:k) where k is the size of the given structure and n is the length of the checked formula.
Satis ability
For proving decidability of the monotone satis ability problem, we can again de ne witness structures and show that a formula is monotone satis able i it has a witness structure. But the structures required are very simple now. Fix a formula 0 , and let AT be the set of subsets of SF ( 0 ) Call this a good subset of w 0 ]. For each w 2 (W 0 \ (w)), let g(w) denote a good subset of (w) containing w similarly, and of size at most m. Let A derivation of the combined system is a nite sequence of formulas where each line is of the form: {` where is an axiom of Ax M or follows from formulas earlier in the sequence by an application of a rule of Ax M , or {`X where is an axiom of Ax X or follows from formulas earlier in the sequence by an application of a rule of Ax X . A thesis or theorem of the combined system is a formula that occurs as the last line of a derivation. When it is of the form` (`X ), we refer to it as a theorem of Ax M (Ax X ). The axiom schemes carry no surprises: schemes (A1) and (A2) are deductive closure axioms for the two modalities. Schemes (A3) through (A5) are the usual properties of the K operator. (A6) asserts Proposition 8, whereas (A7) asserts that the visible substructure is unique. (A8) is the characteristic axiom for monotonicity, specifying that partitions every -equivalence class further. (B0) is the only crucial di erence between the two systems, as it is not valid, but explicitly valid. Note that every theorem of Ax M is also a theorem of Ax X . This allows us, for instance, to derive tautologies as theorems of Ax X due to rule (IE), and`X-versions' of tautologies thanks to rule (XG). The following are some sample theses and derived rules of the combined system. The derivations are easy and hence omitted. b A) is consistent. We assume that b ; = False by convention. A set of formulas ? is consistent i every nite subset of ? is consistent. We will be interested in sets of Ax M -consistent formulas as well as sets of Ax X -consistent formulas. Since every set of the latter type is also one of the former type, when we simply speak of consistent sets, we mean Ax M -consistent sets. A set A is said to be Maximal Consistent, if whenever there is a formula such that A f g is consistent, then 2 A. Theorem 26 The combined system provides a sound and complete axiomatization of monotone valid formulas.
PROOF. Soundness is straightforward, and we have already shown the validity of (A8), the characteristic axiom for monotonicity. To prove completeness, we show that every Ax M -consistent formula is monotone satis able. (Strictly, we should simultaneously show that every Ax X -consistent formula is explicitly satis able as well; but such a proof is easy to carry out on the same lines, and writing it explicitly only makes the presentation tedious, so we omit it.) Fix an Ax M -consistent formula 0 and let SF denote the set SF 0 . Let MAT denote the set of all maximal Ax M -consistent subsets of SF and let XAT denote the set of all maximal Ax X -consistent subsets of SF. Clearly 
Discussion
We have argued that the distinction between logical distinguishability and visibility is one worth making and attempted to demonstrate that a logic of knowledge bearing such features is technically interesting. While this distinction has the sort of philosophical motivation presented in Section 1, there is also a more pragamatic reason for considering it, and that has to do with the way we model systems. One important reason for studying knowledge in the context of computing agents is that the agents' actions at any instant of time are based on the knowledge at that time. This interplay of knowledge, time and action is a major theme in the literature on knowledge in distributed systems (see HF 89] and FHMV 95]). However, knowledge based action must involve computed knowledge and it is here that we feel that the distinction made above is crucial, as the agent being resource limited, may have only limited visibility.
To study this, we need to enrich the frames to include time and action. Further, we have only talked about one reasoner so far, and this needs to be generalized to systems of many reasoners. We believe that the class of Knowledge Transition Systems introduced in KR 94], R 96a], augmented with view functions provide a suitable framework for such a study. Correspondingly the logic would also need to be enriched with modalities talking about reachability. The advantage of such a set-up is that resource limitations can be modelled in a natural way: for instance, we can consider systems where views are uniformly bounded to have at most k states; or insist that only the adjacent states (in the transition system graph) be visible at any state. We can then study interactions between agents one of whom does a one-steplook-ahead whereas the other always looks ahead two steps, and so on. This suggests that a dynamic or temporal logic of view-based knowledge may be worth studying.
An important issue that we have not satisfactorily addressed here is the precise epistemic status of the X modality. We have already observed that it is by itself neither like a knowledge modality nor a belief modality, in the sense originally discussed by Hintikka ( Hi62] ). Since our logic has both the standard knowledge modality and this one, it is similar to logics where agents reason about knowledge of beliefs and so on, like in KL88] and MS93]. However, much of the complexity of the logic in KL88] arises from systems of many reasoners, which we have not studied here. MS93] reduces belief to a form of knowledge, whereas in our framework, belief comes in as an extra-logical notion in the form of views. The closest relationship to theories of belief seems to be in the fact that beliefs are based on evidence, and views can perhaps be seen as providing such evidence. We have studied frames where the visibility of states is dependent on the world state.
At the other end, we can think of static frames, where there is a xed subset W 0 W such that 8w, (w) = W 0 is constant. But then we do not need the X modality; a special proposition which when asserted at w means that w 2 W 0 , would do the job. Construction of a meaning-preserving map from to (when interpreted over static frames) is a straightforward exercise.
For the basic logic of view-based explicit knowledge, we have only shown decidability here, and a complete axiom system has been given only for the monotone subclass of frames. In the general case, the following axiom is sound:
(G) XL L ( boolean)
We believe that a model construction can be carried out for consistent formulas of this system (where (A8) is replaced by (G)), along the lines of the construction in the proof of Theorem 19. However, the details seem tricky, and this is left for future work.
